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Alexander Muravyev*
Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies:
Origin, forms and consequences for enterprise perfomance
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of federal state shareholdings on the performance of Russian
companies. It differs from most similar studies in two respects. Firstly, it focuses on mixed
ownership companies rather than conventional state enterprises. Secondly, it distinguishes
between several types of federal state shareholdings, namely elected blocks, residual
blocks (which may be held by two bodies with different functions – the Ministry for State
Property and the Russian Fund for Federal Property) and golden shares. The paper descri-
bes the origin of federal state shareholdings and discusses their possible implications for
company performance. Econometric analysis shows that companies with state ownership
generally perform worse than the average firm in terms of labour productivity and profita-
bility. However, there are remarkable differences in the performance of companies with
different types of state shareholdings. Companies with residual blocks held by the Property
Fund are the worst performers, followed by companies with residual blocks held by the
Ministry for State Property. Companies with elected shareholdings as well as with golden
shares do not differ from the average enterprises in the respective industries. These diffe-
rences in performance are explained by the different degrees of control the federal state has
over enterprises with various types of shareholdings – greater control is associated with
better performance. The paper concludes that the government should avoid keeping equity
stakes in companies unless there is a good reason to retain them. If the state wants to keep
an ownership stake in a company, reliable control structures must be created. Finally, the
issue of golden shares in strategically important companies seems to be a reasonable alter-
native to retaining some control over them through equity ownership.
	
Corporate governance, state ownership, firm performance, Russia
* Aleksander Muravyev visiting researcher, BOFIT; economist, RECEPAlexander Muravyev Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies: 0rigin,
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Alexander Muravyev
Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies:
Origin, forms and consequences for enterprise perfomance
Tiivistelmä
Tässä tutkimuksessa selvitetään valtion omistuksen vaikutusta yritysten toimintaan Venä-
jällä. Tutkimus eroaa aikaisemmista kahdella tapaa. Ensinnäkin se keskittyy yrityksiin,
joista valtio omistaa osan, ei kokonaan valtion omistamiin yrityksiin. Toiseksi  tutkimuk-
sessa erotellaan valtion erilaiset omistusmuodot:  pysyvät omistukset, yksityistämisestä
jäljelle jääneet omistukset tai ns. golden share -osuudet. Lisäksi yksityistämisestä jäljelle
jääneitä omistuksia voi olla sekä valtionomaisuuden ministeriössä (Ministry for State Pro-
perty) että federaation omaisuusrahastossa (Russian Fund for Federal Property). Tutkimuk-
sessa kuvataan, kuinka erilaiset omistusosuudet ovat syntyneet ja kuinka ne voivat vaikut-
taa yritysten toimintaan. Tutkimuksen ekonometrisessa osassa havaitaan, että yrityksissä,
joista valtio omistaa osan, on yleensä heikompi työn tuottavuus ja pienemmät voitot. On
kuitenkin huomattava, että valtion erilaiset omistusmuodot vaikuttavat yritysten toimintaan
eri tavoin. Huonoiten menestyvät yritykset, joissa valtion omistus on jäänyt jäljelle yksi-
tyistämisprosessista ja sitä hallinnoi omaisuusrahasto. Myös ministeriön hallinnoimat, yk-
sityistämisestä jäljelle jääneet omistukset heikentävät yritysten toimintaa. Muunlaiset val-
tion omistusmuodot eivät näytä vaikuttavan yritysten toimintaan negatiivisesti. Johtopäätös
on, että valtion ei pitäisi säilyttää omistuksia yrityksissä, ellei siihen ole  pätevää syytä. Jos
valtio omistaa yrityksiä, on omistuksille muodostettava luotettava valvontajärjestelmä.
Asiasanat: Corporate governance, valtionomistus, yritysten tehokkuus, VenäjäBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2002
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1  Introduction
Russia is famous for the unprecedented scale and speed of its privatisation programme that
within a couple of years transformed the overwhelming majority of state enterprises into
privately owned companies. By 1995, the public sector in this formerly command economy
was reduced dramatically and produced less than half of Russia’s GDP. In subsequent
years, the state sector continued to shrink due to further, though less dramatic, privatisation
efforts. However, even after a decade of privatisation it remains very large. At the federal
level alone the state remains the sole owner of over 9,700 enterprises and keeps ownership
stakes in about 4,000 companies. In addition, the state is the owner of more than 34,000
organisations such as hospitals, universities and the like (IET, 2002). These figures would
be even higher if enterprises and organisations belonging to the state on the regional level
were considered.
Despite a high incidence of state ownership, there is little systematic evidence on its
consequences for the performance of enterprises and the Russian economy in general. This
issue is particularly interesting in view of the recent criticism of Russian privatisation,
which is regarded by many observers and scholars as having been detrimental rather than
beneficial for enterprise restructuring and improved performance. There is extensive evi-
dence, mostly anecdotal, that Russian privatisation indeed went wrong. For example, Black
et al. (2000) show that soon after the privatisation of profitable oil extraction enterprises
was completed, many of them suddenly turned into loss-making firms. This criticism even
gave rise to suggestions of nationalisation and possible re-privatisation (see e.g., Stiglitz,
1999 and Nellis, 1999). However, the question of whether continued state ownership
would be better remains unanswered. Another related issue concerns corporate governance
mechanisms for enterprises with state participation. These enterprises may differ with res-
pect to the size of the government stakes, the rationale for their retention in state ownership
as well as the state structures that dominate decision-making about asset management.
How do these differences affect enterprise performance? These questions are particularly
important given the fact that in recent years the Russian government has been trying to
shape its policy in the field of managing state assets.
This paper belongs to the strand of literature investigating the impact of state ow-
nership on enterprise performance. It is distinct from most similar papers in two respects.
Firstly, the focus of the paper is on Russian 	 with federal state ownership, typi-
cally partial, rather than conventional state-owned enterprises. Secondly, by explicitly re-
cognising diversity among companies with state ownership, it goes beyond a simple com-
parison of the performance of these firms with that of private companies. The primary goal




The paper is organised as follows. First, it focuses on the evolution of federal state
shareholdings in Russian firms from the early 1990s onwards. Second, it outlines differen-
ces among various types of state shareholdings and discusses their possible implications
for company performance. Then the paper proceeds with econometric analysis of the im-
pact of various types of state shareholdings on company performance.Alexander Muravyev Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies: 0rigin,
forms and consequences for enterprise performance
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2  The origin of companies with mixed ownership
    in Russia
The origin of companies with mixed ownership in the Russian economy is closely related
to the process of privatising large and medium-sized enterprises that was launched in 1992.
Although Russian privatisation is described elsewhere
1, a brief account of the main steps
and major agents which administered the process is crucial for understanding the origin,
structure and likely impact of federal state shareholdings on company performance. This
brief account of Russian privatisation is divided into two sections describing developments
during the mass privatisation period and afterwards. The principal source for this review
comprises various regulations on Russian privatisation, but most references to them are
deliberately omitted in the text to make the exposition shorter.
2.1  The period of mass privatisation
In 1990, privatisation was already considered as the cornerstone of economic policy in
Russia and an initial law on privatisation and other major regulations in the area were
being gradually created. The real opportunity came with the collapse of the USSR in De-
cember 1991 when the Russian Federation became the owner of the all-union property that
was located on its territory. By that time the country had already established its major pri-
vatisation agency – the State Committee for Managing State Property, also known as GKI
– whose main responsibility was to exercise the rights of the state as owner of enterprises.

The State Committee for Managing State Property (GKI) was established in 1990 to exer-
cise the ownership rights in enterprises that belonged to the Russian Federation. In 1997 it
was transformed into the Ministry of State Property (MGI). Since 1997 the main task of the
Ministry has been ensuring a single governmental policy in privatisation and managing
state property as well as coordinating activities of other federal organs of the executive
branch in the field of managing and disposing of state property.
Supervision of the privatisation process was the main task of GKI in 1992-1994. In parti-
cular, it was responsible for approving enterprise privatisation plans and was a founder of
joint-stock companies in which the enterprises offered for privatisation were transformed.
Until recently, GKI received a fraction of revenues from privatisation sales. However, it
did not administer the process of selling state assets.
Most operations of GKI were conducted in regions through its regional branches. In all but
a few regions, however, GKI did not create its own offices but rather endowed regional
committees for managing state property (which were created by and subordinated to the
regional governments) with the rights of its regional branches. The regional committees
were thus under the bilateral supervision of the regional governments and the GKI central
office and administered the privatisation of both federal and regional state enterprises.
                                                
1 See e.g. Boycko et al. (1995).Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2002
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In early 1992 the state divided all state-owned assets into three categories: federal property,
regional property and municipal property. The municipal property category primarily en-
compassed small enterprises belonging to the trade and service sectors while medium-sized
and large enterprises were classified as either federal or regional property.
In parallel, the government classified all enterprises regardless of whether they were
in federal, regional or municipal ownership into four categories: those subject to compulso-
ry privatisation, enterprises that could be privatised only with the special permission of the
government or GKI (in the latter case, the decision to privatise had to be approved by
branch ministries), firms that could be privatised with the permission of regional authori-
ties, and firms that were exempted from privatisation. The assets that were exempted from
privatisation in 1992-1994 (military facilities, atomic reactors, rail transport, etc.) remained
largely under the control of the old branch ministries, usually having been their founding
organs, in the form of non-corporatised state enterprises. The firms whose privatisation
required the approval of regional authorities were in regional ownership and embraced
those necessary for local infrastructure, including local transport facilities, sewage treat-
ment, pharmacies, etc. The enterprises that could be privatised with the permission of the
federal government or GKI were firms in the energy and financial sectors, as well as firms
with a charter capital exceeding one billion RUR (as of January 1992), irrespective of their
sector affiliation.
The latter category of state assets – enterprises that could be included in the priva-
tisation process at the discretion of the Russian government or GKI – gave rise to most
federal state shareholdings that exist today. In cases when the Russian government or GKI
elected to include discretionary firms in the privatisation process, they could still decide
(and they typically did) to withhold a controlling block of 25, 38 or 51% of the firm's sha-
res from transfer. If the government or GKI did not make a decision to retain a block of
shares in a discretionary enterprise when approving its privatisation, all its shares had to be
sold within a four-month period after corporatisation
2. The initial period of retaining these
shares in state ownership was three years, but the state reserved the right to prolong it. He-
reafter, these blocks will be referred to as 
	
	.
Some of these shareholdings were abandoned by the government quite soon through
the creation of state holding companies to which the blocks were transferred. This was
particularly true for the oil, gas, coal and telecommunication sectors. Whether such trans-
fers should be regarded as privatisation is a disputable issue; however, since the blocks
were exempted from direct ownership by the state, they are not considered below.
Another way to retain a certain degree of control over the enterprises that were consi-
dered as strategically important but were nevertheless offered for privatisation was the is-
suance of a 
	 in favour of the state
3. It was assigned as an ordinary share (gi-
ving its owner all the rights provided for owners of ordinary shares, including the right to
receive dividends and the right to vote at shareholder meetings) with a number of addi-
tional rights. In particular, the holder of the golden share was endowed with the right of
veto on a range of important matters, including changes in the corporate charter, major
transactions with company assets, and the reorganisation and liquidation of the company.
As a rule, the golden share was issued for a period of three years, but the government re-
served the right to extend this period. Decisions about issuing golden shares were to be
made at the time of privatisation of each firm. The state committed itself not to retain an
elected block and a golden share in the same enterprise, though it could substitute an elec-
ted block with a golden share.
                                                
2 This norm was not strictly followed, however.
3 A golden share could never be issued in favour of or otherwise acquired by a private person.Alexander Muravyev Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies: 0rigin,
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Last but not least, many of today’s federal state shareholdings are the blocks that were in-
tended for sale, but have not been sold by the state. Hereafter they will be called 	

	
	. Their origin is as follows. The privatisation of enterprises that participated
in the mass privatisation programme presupposed several consequent steps. After the cor-
poratisation of enterprises their shares (except for those reserved in state ownership –
elected shareholdings) were transferred to the Russian Fund for Federal Property (RFFI) –
a special financial organisation established by the state in 1992 to conduct sales of assets.
In the course of privatisation, RFFI first allocated shares to enterprise insiders, then sold
them at voucher auctions and finally through investment tenders or cash auctions in accor-




The Russian Fund for Federal Property (RFFI) was established to act as the seller of pro-
perty of enterprises offered for privatisation as well as of shares of such enterprises. It has
been the only organisation empowered to conduct such sales on behalf of the federal go-
vernment. At present, the Fund is functioning as a specialised financial organisation under
the Russian government, while not being part of it. Since 1998 the Fund has also been em-
powered to sell military property – assets that were at the disposal of the Defence Ministry.
Since 2001 the Fund has also acted as the seller of confiscated property.
Besides conducting the sale of enterprise shares, RFFI has the responsibility to temporarily
possess them and exercise during this period the power of the Russian Federation as owner
at shareholder meetings. It also receives dividends, collects privatisation revenues and
transfers them in accordance with pre-specified proportions. The Fund may also act as
founder of joint-stock companies and purchase shares of companies (except for those
created in the privatisation process – it is banned from purchasing shares in privatised
firms).
In regions, the Fund operates through its own branches as well as (on the basis of special
agreements) through regional funds for state property, which are subordinated to regional
authorities. The fund and its branches are partially financed through privatisation procee-
dings, of which they receive a certain fraction.
As Russian privatisation experience tells, employees of enterprises that were offered for
privatisation typically obtained 40 to 56% of shares depending on their choice of priva-
tisation method
4. Voucher auctions typically involved 29% of shares and 15 to 31% of
company shares were to be sold through investment tenders or cash auctions. These sales
were administered by RFFI. The quick sale of these blocks was apparently in the spirit of
the privatisation process. Thus, the post-voucher privatisation programme directly obliged
the regional property funds to divest their holdings by January 1995. But, as noted by Ra-
dygin and Malginov (2001), this regulation was often violated. One commonly cited reason
for that is the absence of interested buyers. But it may well be the case that it was not the
                                                
4 The calculation goes as follows. Most large and medium-sized enterprises were privatised
according to two out of three options allowed by the privatisation regulations. Under Option 1,
employees received 25% of the shares for free, managers could buy 5% and 10% could go to an
employee privatisation fund, which together amounted to 40%. Under Option 2, employees
acquired 51% of the shares for cash or vouchers and could buy an additional 5% through an
employee privatisation fund. Option 3 was used very seldom and basically resulted in employee
ownership close to 50%.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2002
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failure to find buyers that prevented sale. Since complete privatisation led to the closure of
the property funds, they had strong incentives to retain shares as justification for their own
existence. As noted by Pistor and Turkewitz (1996), regional property funds or even re-
gional branches of GKI often decided to retain blocks of shares or issue golden shares in
companies subject to privatisation, thus violating basic regulations on privatisation.
Thus, apart from a huge number of enterprises and organisations fully owned by the
state, by the end of mass privatisation the Russian state on the federal level kept:
•  elected shareholdings in companies considered as strategically important, retained
on the basis of GKI or government decisions and held by GKI;
•  residual shareholdings which had not been sold or otherwise transferred, typically
in the hands of RFFI and its regional branches;
•  golden shares in companies considered as strategically important.
The administration of Russian privatisation makes it very difficult to assess the number
and the size of these shareholdings by the end of mass privatisation (July 1994). The task is
easier with respect to elected shareholdings. Radygin and Malginov (2001), who summari-
ze relevant statistics for the entire period 1993-2000, report that in 1993-94 the state (on all
levels, including regions) made decisions to reserve shareholdings in 1,935 companies
(about 8% of all enterprises offered for privatisation) and golden shares in 996 enterprises
(4%). Little is known about the number of residual shareholdings kept by RFFI. This is
because shares were typically transferred to regional property funds and there were no
comprehensive statistics on the aggregate number of such shareholdings. As noted by Pis-
tor and Turkewitz (1996), the Federal Fund in Moscow was not capable of monitoring their
activities and did not even have access to data on post-voucher privatisations conducted by
them.
2.2  Developments after mass privatisation
Since 1995, several parallel processes have affected the incidence of federal state share-
holdings in the Russian economy. The state continued its policy of privatisation, though at
a much slower pace. It concerned enterprises exempted from the mass privatisation prog-
ramme and companies with government participation in the form of both elected and resi-
dual shareholdings. Since 1995, the government made decisions to keep either a golden
share or a block in many enterprises that were offered for privatisation. The share of firms
privatised in this way was much higher than during the mass privatisation period.
As already noted, the government planned to keep most elected shareholdings in state
ownership during three years. Within this period they could not be sold without a special
decision by the government or GKI. However, the government did not commit itself to
selling the elected blocks whose term of retention had expired. Neither did it always trans-
fer them to RFFI, which administered the sale process. Therefore, with respect to the elec-
ted shareholdings, a variety of options were possible. They might still be kept by GKI eit-
her as elected or residual shareholdings (depending on whether the initial term of their re-
tention was extended or not), could be held by RFFI as residual shareholdings ready forAlexander Muravyev Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies: 0rigin,
forms and consequences for enterprise performance
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sale or could be sold or disposed of otherwise, like in the notorious loans-for-shares sche-
me
5.
By autumn 1995 the deadline for retaining shares was approaching for many of these
blocks and their fate had to be determined. This was particularly acute due to the beginning
of the so-called money privatisation, through which the government wanted to raise re-
venues to cover its budget deficit. The government started to compile a list of strategically
important enterprises whose shares were to be exempted from sales. By September 1995 a
list of 2,799 such firms was approved. It was subsequently enlarged in 1996 and 1997 to
embrace about 3,000 enterprises. In 1997 a second law on privatisation was enacted which
envisaged no time limits for retaining shareholdings of strategic enterprises in state ow-
nership. All state blocks that had the status of elected shareholdings by mid-1997 retained
it on a permanent basis, unless the state decided to change it.
In 1998, when the government was desperately looking for additional revenues, the
list was cut dramatically to embrace only 697 companies. Over 2,000 blocks that had lost
the status of elected holdings automatically became residual holdings ready for sale. But
the financial crisis that broke out in August 1998 buried any hopes for their privatisation.
Most of the blocks that were elected in 1995-1997 are still kept in state ownership (as resi-
dual blocks). As for the list of elected holdings, it was reconsidered several times since
1998 and by mid-2000 contained 723 companies.
After the completion of the mass privatisation programme, the state also had to decide
on the future of golden shares that it reserved in strategic enterprises. In most cases the
period of retaining these shares was extended. Similarly to the elected shareholdings, the
1997 law on privatisation eliminated the temporary status of golden shares. They could be
retained for as long as the government wished, unless the decision to cancel was made. But
in some cases the term of retention of golden shares expired before August 1997 and was
not extended in time. As a result, the state ended up with a share that lost its special rights
and was transformed into an ordinary one. The ridiculous situation with the federal go-
vernment having just one ordinary share in a company proved to be difficult to escape
from. The share could not be liquidated (as it was a part of the company charter capital)
and could hardly be sold to anyone except for the issuing company
6.
Another development that occurred after mass privatisation was a transfer of shares
from the federal government to regional governments. This process particularly concerned
residual shareholdings that remained at the disposal of RFFI. It started in early 1996 when
the approaching presidential elections forced the federal government to look for support
from the regional authorities. In most cases the transfer of shares served as compensation
for federal government debt to the regions (Radygin and Malginov, 2001).
                                                
5 The loans-for-shares privatisation scheme is described elsewhere. See, e.g., Lieberman and
Veimetra (1996).
6 The 1997 law on privatisation significantly changed the legal status of the golden share. One of
the changes was that since 1997 the state could reserve a "special right" to participate in managing
companies instead of using the golden share. This special right was not associated with any share
issued by the company. However, even now the term golden share and special right are used
interchangeably.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2002
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2.3  The structure of federal government shareholdings
in Russian companies by 2001
The above account of the privatisation process makes it possible to distinguish among five
types of government shareholdings (or participation in companies):
•  elected blocks of shares kept by MGI (former GKI)
7;
•  residual shareholdings kept by MGI (formerly elected blocks which lost their status
and were not transferred to RFFI);
•  residual shareholdings held by RFFI;
•  golden shares held by MGI;
•  single ordinary shares (former golden ones) kept either by MGI or by RFFI
8.
There are no comprehensive data on the incidence of shareholdings belonging to these
groups. According to MGI, by August 2001 the federal state had equity stakes (blocks of
shares) in 3,949 enterprises, of which 88 had 100% state ownership, 625 had 50-99%,
1,393 had 25-50%, and 1,843 had less than 25% of their shares owned by the state (IET,
2002). In addition, it possessed golden shares in 542 companies (some of them were
among the above-mentioned 3,949 companies with state blocks).
These figures (reported by MGI) embraced all ownership stakes held by the federal
government regardless of whether they were kept by MGI or RFFI. Available data from
RFFI tell us that in 2001 RFFI kept 2,400 blocks of shares, of which about one third were
represented by blocks below 10%, one third – by blocks between 10 and 25%, and the re-
maining – by stakes exceeding 25%. In 55 companies RFFI had a 100% share
9.
As for the shares held by MGI, the only publicly available information comes from
the list of strategically important companies, which, as mentioned above, included about
723 firms in 2000. There is no general information about residual blocks held by the Mi-
nistry. Neither can it be accurately inferred from the above-reported figures. The main
problem is that the reported information concerns the number of companies, not blocks,
and there are many companies in which various types of state shareholdings co-exist, e.g. a
residual block of RFFI neighbours on an elected block of MGI
10.
                                                
7 There may be several companies in which elected blocks are held by RFFI. Apparently, this may
have happened when the government first allowed the sale of a certain block, transferred it to RFFI
but then decided to retain it.
8 It is worth noting that this classification does not perfectly comply with the Russian regulations
that have distinguished among elected shareholdings ( ), residual ones
(
	
) and golden shares (	).
9 Interview with a deputy head of RFFI V. Fatikov (Izvestia, 12 February 2002).
10 There is some anecdotal evidence that representatives from these bodies voted differently at
shareholder meetings. This resulted in suggestions by MGI to deprive RFFI of its right to manage
residual shareholdings (AK&M, 27 October 2000).Alexander Muravyev Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies: 0rigin,
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3  Federal government approach to managing
   state shareholdings
From the very start of privatisation, the presence of government shareholdings in com-
panies raised the question of whether and how the state should participate in the corporate
governance of these firms. It was particularly acute for elected shareholdings, which, as
was claimed, were retained to protect essential interests of the state. The respective regula-
tions started to emerge already in 1992.
3.1   General approach
The principal mechanism that developed in these regulations was the appointment of rep-
resentatives of the state to supervise companies with state participation as well as the ap-
pointment of directors to corporate boards. These representatives could be public officials
(appointed on the basis of decisions made by the President, government, GKI or RFFI) or
other persons (acting on the basis of special contracts concluded with GKI or RFFI).
These regulations were intended to provide a tough control structure for state rep-
resentatives, who had to disclose their voting intentions and were required to obtain prior
approval from the state for a number of important decisions concerning companies. But the
legislation suffered from ambiguity, as was often the case during the 1990s. For example,
the state bodies responsible for making appointments were simply listed and there were no
mechanisms to solve potential disputes between them. Many loopholes were being gradu-
ally eliminated, but the most important changes (e.g., clarification of the procedure for
appointing representatives and using shareholder rights in general) were introduced only in
1999-2000.
Most representatives of the state were government officials. By 1999, for example,
less than one percent of state representatives in companies were not public servants
11. The
major obstacle to appointing other agents was ambiguity about sources of finance to provi-
de them with remuneration for the relevant activity. As for the appointment of public ser-
vants, it proved to bring ambiguous results for several reasons. Firstly, either these rep-
resentatives had insufficient work experience in the activity area of the companies or had
no such experience at all. Secondly, each representative was typically supposed to supervi-
se several companies, often in different regions and sectors. This job had to be done along-
side his/her regular duties at MGI or other state bodies. Thirdly, there was little interest on
the part of the representatives, as they were directly banned from receiving any remunera-
tion for their activity
12. Furthermore, the supervision of the activity of state representatives
                                                
11 See The Concept for the Management of State Property and Privatisation in the Russian
Federation, adopted by the Russian government in September 1999.
12 Surprisingly, however, the Minister for State Property admitted that there was a queue of
government officials from regional administrations, the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, the
Ministry for Economy and the Ministry of Taxation wishing to be appointed as representatives of
the state in certain companies (Interview with F. Gazizullin, Minister of State Property, Gazeta.ru,
23 February 2000). The reasons for this enthusiasm are unclear and probably have to do with
opportunities for personal enrichment among the representatives. As the Minister explained, "ourBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2002
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on the part of the government was rather weak. Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of
the passive (or self-interested) behaviour of the representatives can be seen in the numero-
us cases of dilution of state shareholdings through new issues of shares that received ap-
proval from the representatives.
Another mechanism through which the government tried to improve the corporate go-
vernance of companies with state ownership was the transfer of shares to so-called trust
management. It required a special agreement between the state and a legal or natural per-
son that specified the rights and remuneration of the trustee. The principal advantage was
an opportunity to appoint trust managers on a competitive basis and to provide them with
monetary incentives. On the other hand, these contracts created a wide leeway for trustee
opportunism. Perhaps this was the main reason why this mechanism has existed only in the
form of pilot projects.
The discussion of the role of representatives would be incomplete without mentioning
the involvement of the regional authorities. Radygin and Malginov (2001) note that in 70%
of cases the representation of the government interests is entrusted to local officers. Data
from RFFI show even more remarkable figures: out of more than 2000 representatives,
only about 300 come from central ministries (Izvestia, 12 February 2002). These figures
may be interpreted as indicating a difference between residual and elected blocks: the for-
mer are more likely to be managed by representatives from regions rather than the centre.
It is not unlikely, therefore, that regional governments interfere in the decision-making
process in companies with federal state ownership in order to pursue their own agenda.
This is particularly easy if control over representatives on the part of the federal state
structures is minimal (as was the case with the RFFI Moscow office in the 1990s).
3.2 Managing various types of state shareholdings
3.2.1 Elected shareholdings
Elected shareholdings were the most closely supervised by the federal government from
the early 1990s onwards. This should not come as a surprise – if the retention of these
blocks was motivated by the importance of the respective enterprises, the government had
to commit itself to an activist ownership stance. However, as was shown, the level of in-
volvement in managing these firms was hardly too high, at least until the late 1990s. For
most of the time since 1992, the major distinct feature of these blocks was that they could
not be sold without a special decision of the government, i.e. before changing their status
to residual blocks ready for sale
13. This emphasises the long-term commitment of the state
to keep these shareholdings. As already noted, these blocks are held by MGI with only a
few possible exceptions.
                                                                                                                                                   
task is to direct their energy into the right channel", thus admitting that their efforts were directed
to other purposes.
13 Since February 2001, however, privatisation of any block of shares remaining in state ownership
has to be approved by the government.Alexander Muravyev Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies: 0rigin,
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3.2.2  Residual shareholdings
Residual shareholdings embrace assets that the government has offered for sale or decided
to divest in the foreseeable future. It means that the state has renounced its interests in kee-
ping them as a part of its portfolio. Since these assets are likely to be retained on a tempo-
rary basis, the amount of resources that the state is ready to spend on managing them (in-
volvement of the state in enterprise activity) is likely to be smaller compared to the elected
blocks. The passive stance of the state with respect to these blocks may also stem from the
fact that many of them are too small to let the state affect corporate decision-making in any
significant way (e.g., to appoint a director to the board).
	
	
	. The major feature of these blocks is that their voting po-
wer was originally restricted by privatisation regulations to 20% of votes. Whether RFFI
had 30 or 50% of voting shares, it could have only 20% of the votes at the shareholder
meeting. In August 1997, the second law on privatisation eased this restriction by permit-
ting the Fund to have 25% + 1 share as voting shares. The restriction was finally removed




	. They were not subject to much regulation. In particular,
there were no restrictions on the voting power of these blocks and no special procedures
for managing them. Importantly, these blocks evolved from elected shareholdings, mostly
in 1998, when the government cut the number of the latter by about 75%.
3.2.3 Golden shares
Until 1997, the holder of a golden share had only a number of the vetoing rights that could
be exercised by a representative of the state. Since August 1997, the power of the govern-
ment vis-à-vis companies with golden shares was extended. The government received the
right to designate one member to the board of directors and one to the auditing commission
of the company, without the approval of the general meeting of shareholders, and to re-
quest the convening of extraordinary meetings of shareholders. The state was also endo-
wed with all the rights possessed by holders of two percent blocks of shares (e.g., the right
to put forward suggestions for the agenda of shareholder meetings)
14. In contrast to com-
panies in which the government had a block of shares, only public servants could represent
the federal state in companies with golden shares.
It would be inappropriate not to mention important changes that occurred in the field
of managing state shareholdings since March 2000. Firstly, not only elected, but also resi-
dual shareholdings were explicitly subjected to regulation
15. Secondly, a procedure for
selecting and appointing representatives of the state was specified. The selection of candi-
dates and formulation of the position of the state with respect to companies was given to
                                                
14 These provisions are confirmed in the third law on privatisation enacted in 2002.
15 The difference between elected and residual shareholdings disappeared with the enactment of the
third law on privatisation in 2002. The new law introduced the concept of strategic companies
instead of elected shareholdings. The list of these companies and any decisions concerning their
privatisation are to be approved by the president. Thus, the new law distinguishes between different
enterprises, not between different blocks of shares. However, by summer 2002 the list of strategic
companies was not yet ready.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2002
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the branch ministries, which submitted their proposals to the MGI. MGI, in turn, appointed
state representatives and co-ordinated their activity. For 167 companies the functions of the
Ministry are to be exercised by the government
16. Importantly, RFFI is supposed to follow
the same procedures as the Ministry. However, state blocks of the same company held by
different bodies were not merged. This can still lead to contradictory policies pursued by
the two bodies with respect to the same companies, which has regularly occurred in the
past.
4  Possible implications for company performance
There are several issues to take into account when studying the impact of state sharehol-
dings on company performance in Russia. The first one is related to the 		
! of productive assets, especially in companies with mixed ownership. What could we
expect from the state as one of the owners of companies? The second refers to the 		
	
	 under Russian law as well as differences between the two state bodies res-
ponsible for managing these shareholdings. MGI and RFFI may have different incentives,
power and degrees of freedom in managing shares. The third issue that has to be tackled in
empirical analysis relates to the 	. Are companies with federal state ow-
nership randomly distributed across "good" and "bad" firms? If they were initially (pre-
privatisation) bad firms, one can hardly learn anything about the role of state shareholdings
by comparing the results of these companies with those of privately owned firms. The per-
formance of companies, whether it is good or bad, may just reflect the fact that these com-
panies have always been respectively good or bad.
4.1 The role of state ownership
Most of the contemporary economic literature views public ownership as detrimental for
enterprise efficiency and performance. Efficiency losses are attributed to the lack of incen-
tives that arises due to information asymmetries and incomplete contracting problems.
Zinnes et al. (2001) point out two lines of arguments explaining the inefficiency of state
ownership. The managerial view that was advocated by Vickers and Yarrow (1990) assu-
mes that the state is unable to perfectly monitor enterprise managers. The threat of take-
over or bankruptcy, which instils discipline in privately owned firms, is also non-existent
in state-owned enterprises. The political view underlines the risk of political interference,
which forces managers to re-orient from profit maximisation to other goals such as emplo-
yment maximisation (see e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, 1996).
It is much less clear to what extent the evils of state ownership are typical in com-
panies in which the state owns a fraction of shares. There seems to have been little research
in this area. On the one hand, these companies face greater discipline, as they may go
bankrupt or even become a takeover target. As private owners have a genuine interest in
company profit maximisation, the internal monitoring system may be more efficient than
in the case of fully state-owned enterprises. The risk of political interference may also be
                                                
16 These companies are not necessarily those with elected shareholdings. For example, RFFI has
shares in 32 of these 167 companies and in three of them it is the only organ that keeps state shares.Alexander Muravyev Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies: 0rigin,
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weaker because the state does not simply have enough power to interfere. Especially when
the state ownership is small enough can we expect that the companies behave more like
fully privately owned firms.
One important aspect of state ownership is the opportunity for bailouts of poorly per-
forming firms by the government. The prospect of a bailout may even make it easier for
firms with state ownership to raise external funds, e.g., in the form of bank credits, because
these investments are considered as being to some extent protected by the state. But this
creates adverse incentives for the firms not to care about efficiency and performance be-
cause they will be rescued in any case. It is likely that the probability of a bailout is higher
for firms with a larger stake owned by the state.
Even if state ownership brings in a number of problems, there is no guarantee that pri-
vatised (not originally private) companies in the transition countries perform better. Many
argue that it is exactly what happened in Russia. Privatisation, as is often claimed, transfer-
red state assets to economic agents whose primary goal was to grab and disappear. This
paper is not a proper place to go deeper into the investigation of possible reasons for such
behaviour. Most often, the giveaway nature of Russian privatisation as well poor protection
of property rights are put forward as likely explanations. On the empirical side, there is
some prior evidence that the role of the state is not always negative in Russia. For example,
Perevalov et al. (2000) question the importance of private ownership by showing that the
performance of companies wholly owned by the state scarcely differed from that of priva-
tised firms with little or no residual state ownership. One of the findings of Kuznetsov and
Muravyev (2001) shows that state ownership puts some restraints on the rent-seeking be-
haviour of private shareholders in Russian companies. Anecdotal evidence on the same
issue is even more extensive (see e.g., Black et al., 2000).
4.2 Status and management of state shareholdings
As shown before, different types of government shareholdings are associated with different
degrees of government involvement in managing companies, which is particularly obvious
when elected and residual blocks are compared. The question arises whether or not the
greater involvement of the state is positive for the performance of firms. On the one hand,
little interference by the state may be beneficial, as companies are likely to be run as purely
private firms pursuing higher efficiency and profits. On the other hand, it creates a discre-
pancy between control rights and cash flow rights for managers and private shareholders.
Having all the control, but just a fraction of the profits (which must be shared with the sta-
te), managers are more inclined to behave opportunistically, e.g. to extract the private be-
nefits of control. In other words, the corporate governance problem becomes more severe
if the state cedes all the control rights to the managers and private shareholders. In contrast,
greater involvement by the state can result in smaller room for opportunistic behaviour by
managers (even though the monitoring of managers by the state is likely to be imperfect),
but can bring about a distortion of the company objective function
17. This discussion im-
plies that one cannot accurately predict which of the two – elected blocks (presumably with
better control by the state) or residual shareholdings (with limited involvement by the sta-
te) – is better for enterprise performance.
                                                
17 The role of the state in monitoring managers may be particularly important if the state is the only
large shareholder in a company.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2002
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In turn, residual shareholdings are kept by two governing bodies – MGI and RFFI. Should
we expect any difference in the performance of companies with MGI and RFFI residual
blocks? The major difference between these types of blocks is that RFFI is more restricted
in voting with its blocks and we face the problem already discussed of whether tighter
control is better for company performance. The differences in the degree of control bet-
ween MGI and RFFI may also stem from their own status. A ministry and a financial or-
ganisation (even though it operates under the Russian government) are likely to have diffe-
rent degrees of power. This may be particularly important given that most shareholdings
are managed by regional officers, who also report to regional governments. MGI has pre-
sumably more power than RFFI in any disputes with regional authorities
18. Moreover, the
origin of many MGI and RFFI blocks is different. While MGI residual blocks come from
formerly elected shareholdings, RFFI keeps shareholdings that have not been sold.
Where RFFI seems to have an advantage over MGI is in a better link between the
amount of financial resources RFFI receives (to the extent they come from privatisation
revenues) and its efforts to manage and privatise companies. In other words, RFFI has
better financial incentives and can benefit from maximising the value of its shareholdings
and their subsequent sale
19.
Golden shares provide the state with no operating control over companies, but with a
range of vetoing rights. Moreover, the government can designate its representative to the
board of directors. The difference between a golden share and a block of shares, let's say of
25%, is that the state as the owner of the golden share is not a claimant on company profit.
Therefore, in contrast to the situation in which the government has a block of shares and
plays a passive role in corporate governance, the presence of golden shares does not create
incentives for other shareholders to expropriate the state. Thus, under a passive approach
on the part of the state, golden shares may be better than blocks of shares in the hands of
the state. When the state takes a more active stance, companies with golden shares may be
more protected from its excessive interference. Still, the presence of golden shares (as well
as state shareholdings in general) may create a disincentive for potential investors in equity
since there is a risk that their policies (e.g., restructuring programmes) will be blocked by
the government.
                                                
18 The role of regional authorities in managing companies with federal state ownership remains
unclear. On the one hand, they presumably have high incentives (perhaps higher that the federal
government) to interfere in enterprise affairs if things go wrong. For example, they need to
maintain social stability that could be threatened in case of enterprise closure. They are also
interested in the good performance of firms because the latter are important taxpayers. On the other
hand, there is a dangerous discrepancy between the cash flow rights and control rights of regional
governments, because they are not residual claimants on company profit. Moreover, regional
governments may impose various non-economic goals on firms such as retaining low levels of
unemployment.
19 Although MGI also received a part of privatisation revenues until recently, a direct link between
MGI policies on managing companies and MGI revenues did not exist simply because some of the
MGI blocks were exempted from sale and, more importantly, MGI did not administer the process
of sale.Alexander Muravyev Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies: 0rigin,
forms and consequences for enterprise performance
20
4.3 Selection problems
Although the first section of this paper provided a detailed account of the origin of state
shareholdings in privatised companies, there remains a difficult question of what sort of
firms they were before privatisation. Even with respect to elected shareholdings, there are
different views. Radygin and Malginov (2001) state that elected shareholdings were con-
centrated primarily in enterprises and industries that were subject to a particularly severe
decline during the transition period. On the other hand, the same authors claim that the pre-
privatisation performance of enterprises (the share of loss-making firms within the group)
whose shares were elected by the state was better than the performance of the average firm.
As argued by Chubais et al. (1999), who were the top officers administering privatisation
in 1991-1994, decisions concerning privatisation were often a result of a bargaining pro-
cess between GKI, which wanted to sell more, and branch ministries, which wanted to re-
tain more assets in state ownership. With respect to RFFI blocks, the question seems to
have no satisfactory answer at all. The proportion of blocks that raised no interest among
potential investors and of blocks that were kept by RFFI for other reasons (e.g., to justify
its own existence or, possibly, to extract rents from the companies) is unknown.
5  State shareholdings and company performance:
   Econometric analysis
This section investigates the impact of federal state shareholdings on the performance of
Russian companies. It is based on a database covering companies with federal state ow-
nership, which was obtained from the Ministry of State Property in early 2001. A descrip-
tion of the database is reported in the Appendix. Since there is limited information on the
number of state shareholdings of different status as well as their distribution across com-
panies of different size and industry affiliation, it makes sense to start with descriptive sta-
tistics for government shareholdings.
5.1  Federal government shareholdings in Russia: Basic
   descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides information on the distribution of various types of government sharehol-
dings across major sectors of the economy
20. First, the table shows that most companies
with government participation belong to industry, other significant sectors being R&D,
services, as well as transport and communications. As for the average size of the govern-
ment blocks of shares, it exceeds 30%. In the R&D and trade sectors the average is higher
and approaches 36% and 41% correspondingly. In the other sectors the share of the state is
below average, with the lowest figures in agriculture and construction.
                                                
20 Hereafter descriptive statistics will be shown for enterprises with known codes of sector
affiliation only. Enterprises with golden shares will also be excluded.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2002
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On average, the Ministry holds over 17% and RFFI holds about 13% of the shares in the
sampled companies. In all sectors but agriculture, the size of the MGI shareholdings ex-
ceeds that of RFFI. Particularly significant fractions of shares are kept by MGI in the trade
and R&D sectors. Most blocks held by the Ministry are residual. Their average size is clo-
se to 10%, while the average for elected blocks is about 7%. However, there are two sec-
tors – namely transport and communications as well as trade, where MGI elected blocks
are larger on average than MGI residual blocks. The average size of the Ministry sharehol-
dings in agriculture is small and there are no MGI elected blocks at all in this sector. As for
RFFI residual blocks, their size does not vary across sectors as much as the size of MGI
shareholdings. RFFI blocks are particularly large in companies belonging to agriculture,
trade and industry. Finally, the size of various types of state shareholdings in industrial
companies is very close to the average across all sectors.
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Table 2 shows the number and percentage of firms having state shareholdings of various
status and size
21. The size of most shareholdings falls in the range between 0 and 50%;
only in 19% of companies does the state have a larger stake. There are remarkable diffe-
rences between MGI and RFFI shareholdings. First, most MGI shareholdings (61%) fall in
the range between 25 to 50%, while almost two thirds of RFFI blocks are smaller than 25%
of shares. As for MGI shareholdings, elected blocks tend to be larger than residual ones.
Elected blocks are above 25% in 85% of cases, while residual blocks exceed 25% only in
66% of cases.
Table 2. Number of firms having state shareholdings of various status and size
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21 Three ownership categories are distinguished – blocks in the range from 0 to 25%, 25 to 50% and
over 50%. The reason is the following: blocks below 25% give the state a very limited influence on
corporate decision-making and certainly no blocking power (unless the state has a golden share).
Blocks in the second range typically imply no operating control, but provide the state with blocking
power. The last category may imply operating control of the state over companies.Alexander Muravyev Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies: 0rigin,
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Table 3 provides information on the distribution of various types of shareholdings across
company size as measured by employment in 2000
22. The total number of observations is
about half of the original sample, since employment data are missing for many firms.
Small firms are defined as those having fewer than 200 employees, medium-sized from
200 to 1,000 employees and large firms – above 1,000 employees. The table shows that
government shareholdings are larger in smaller firms. However, there is a clear differen-
tiation between MGI and RFFI blocks. In small firms, the size of RFFI shareholdings is 2.5
times higher than that of MGI. In contrast, the size of MGI blocks in larger firms is larger
than the size of RFFI blocks. In particular, the share of MGI elected blocks is the largest in
big companies.
Table 3. Distribution of government shareholdings by their status and company size
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As for the golden shares, they are present in 84 small companies, 109 medium-sized and
59 large ones and are mostly concentrated in industry and transport and communication.
5.2  Sample
To reveal the impact of state ownership on company performance, the MGI database was
matched with the Alba and Gnosis datasets, which contain financial and employment data.
These databases are the best source of financial information about the firms and are com-
piled from Goskomstat data. However, the financial information in these databases is
available primarily for industrial firms. For that reason, enterprises belonging to other sec-
tors are left out of the analysis. This should not introduce a serious bias, as industry is the
most representative sector with respect to various types of government shareholding. As
was shown before, the distribution of government stakes in industrial companies is very
close to that in the entire population of companies with state ownership. Another reason is
that it can be beneficial to concentrate on a relatively homogenous sector where perfor-
mance measures presumably have lower variation than across the entire economy.
Since we are interested in comparing the performance of companies with federal state
ownership and enterprises without federal state ownership, the sample was extended to
include all other firms from the Gnosis and Alba datasets that belong to industry and have
no federal state ownership
23. Importantly, the sample was restricted to those firms that
                                                
22 Employment data are taken from the Alba dataset.
23 Most firms that were added are fully privately owned businesses, but some have regional and
municipal ownership as reported in the Alba database. It distinguishes among 25 categories of
ownership, mostly mixed ownership forms (e.g., Russian ownership with a share of foreign
ownership), but the stakes are never reported.  It is worth noting that ownership information fromBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2002
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existed by 1993. This was done in order to exclude (or, at least, to significantly reduce the
number of) enterprises that were originally created as private businesses during the period
of transition. It is obvious that these start-ups do not provide a suitable framework for
analysing the effect of 
	!	, as they might have access to better tech-
nology, management skills etc. from their very foundation.
5.3  Econometric model
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L  is a measure of company performance,
#L  is a lagged value of company performance,
"!	L  is a vector of variables describing state ownership,
L  is a binary variable that equals to unity if a firm is subject to control by the
Ministry for Antimonopoly Policy and zero otherwise,
L  is a measure of company size (logarithm of employment in 1993),

	L  is a vector of dummy variables for sub-sectors within industry.
The concept of enterprise performance allows many interpretations. In applied studies it is
common to associate improvements in firm performance with increased profitability,
higher efficiency and increased output. In developed market economies it is also common
to use Tobin’s Q as a proxy for expected long-run firm performance.
It is generally difficult to find a reliable indicator of firm performance in the transition
economy of Russia. The major issue is the inappropriate measurement of capital stock,
which makes it problematic to use return on equity or estimate total factor productivity.
There are also problems in measuring output (due to the presence of barter, which was wi-
despread until quite recently) and employment (due to part-time employment or non-paid
vacations for employees in Russian firms). Perhaps the biggest concern is profit, if measu-
red net of taxes since in Russia taxes are often viewed as endogenous rather than paramet-
ric.
Another specific issue concerns the applicability of the standard measures of perfor-
mance (which are typically applied to private firms) to companies with state ownership. It
may be the case that state-owned enterprises operate to achieve not only profit, but also
other goals, like providing essential services or employment in a particular region. In fact,
in many countries the state is engaged in business activity exactly for such purposes and
not for the sake of profit maximisation. However, it may be argued that the concern about
the inappropriateness of traditional measures of firm performance is less relevant for the
sampled enterprises with partial ownership by the Russian state. First, they are companies
rather than state-owned enterprises and are therefore subject to market pressures such as
the threat of bankruptcy and possibly takeovers. Hence, they have to have efficiency and
                                                                                                                                                   
the Alba dataset is largely consistent with that from the Ministry database: most firms from the
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profit maximisation among their priorities. Secondly, the state has already denounced its
interest in retaining ownership in most of these companies (most blocks are residual, not
elected). Hence, they are not expected to produce some public goods or services that the
free market would fail to deliver
24. In general, therefore, the standard criteria of economic
performance are applicable to the sampled firms with state ownership.
Finally, there is the issue of data availability. For the majority of industrial companies, the
Alba and Gnosis datasets provide information about sales volume, taxable profit and em-
ployment. Other financial data are available for a much smaller number of firms. Due to
data availability problems and the above discussion concerning performance measures,
subsequent analysis is based on two performance measures – labour productivity (loga-
rithm of the ratio of sales to employment) and profitability (the ratio of taxable profit to
sales revenues) in the year 2000 – the last year with available data
25. These measures are
obviously imperfect. For example, labour productivity is likely to vary significantly due to
different capital intensity across sub-sectors. However, this problem can be addressed by
using a rich set of dummy variables for sub-sectors.
Lagged performance is used to correct regression results for possible endogeneity of
state ownership and its particular types. The endogeneity issue as applied to state ow-
nership is not clear-cut, as shown before. The inclusion of lagged values of performance
makes it possible to control for the performance of enterprises at the start of transition,
when virtually all of them were state-owned, and therefore should reveal the true role of
state ownership.
Lagged values of dependent variables are constructed using company financial reports
and employment data from 1993. The use of data from this particular year is not uncontro-
versial. The best solution would be to use pre-privatisation performance data, for example
from 1991, when all firms had the same ownership structure fully belonging to the state.
However, several problems emerge with such an approach. The first and most obvious one
is the availability of data that are rather fragmented for earlier periods. For example, many
enterprises changed their codes in the state registry and cannot be identified. In addition,
earlier data are less reliable, as many enterprises underwent reorganisation – some units
were separated and some were added. Another issue refers to pricing. During Soviet times
the prices that enterprises charged were determined by the state rather than the market. In
1992 the state liberalised prices on most commodities, but continued price regulation in
several sectors, gradually abandoning it in subsequent years. Therefore, later data are more
reliable as there is less chance of price controls being present. However, the use of later
data for computing lagged performance brings the risk that they no longer show initial
conditions of enterprises but rather incorporate the effect of privatisation that took off in
1993. Therefore, the use of data from 1993 should be considered as a compromise solution.
It is assumed that by this time most enterprises were allowed to charge market prices for
their products and changes in the ownership structure of some enterprises due to their pri-
vatisation in late 1992 and 1993 did not yet have much effect on their performance.
For continuous variables entering regression equations, outliers were dealt with by
winsorising the upper and lower 2.5% of the sample. Winsorising is a robust procedure that
                                                
24 Elected shareholdings may be an exception in this respect. If they are indeed retained in order to
guarantee the provision of some public goods or to provide employment in a particular region, the
respective enterprises may have a greater chance of failing according to standard criteria of
economic efficiency and performance.
25 This reduces the sample to 4,467 industrial firms, of which 698 have a state block or a golden
share. In particular, there are 303 companies with an MGI block (208 with MGI residual and 105
with MGI elected), 419 companies with RFFI shareholdings and 65 companies with golden shares.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2002
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identifies observations in the upper and lower tails and assigns the value of the cut-off de-
fining the tail to the observations with extreme values instead of removing them.
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The regression equations include a rich set of dummy variables for sub-sectors within
industry. Eighteen industries are distinguished: 1) power generation, 2) fuel, 3) ferrous
metallurgy, 4) non-ferrous metallurgy, 5) chemical, 6) petrochemical, 7) machinery, 8)
forestry and pulp and paper, 9) stone and clay, 10) glass, 11) light, 12) food processing, 13)
microbiology, 14) flour-grinding, 15) medical equipment, 16) printing and two special ca-
tegories for enterprises that do not fit any of the above – 17) other industrial enterprises
and 18) headquarters of holding companies. Machinery is the largest group among the 18
mentioned and is used as a base category in all regressions.
Several specifications have been used to capture the overall impact of federal state
ownership as well as shareholdings of different types and size. The analysis starts with a
simple specification where the vector of ownership variables is represented by just one
variable – a dummy for any form of state participation in a company and ends up with spe-
cification where continuous variables for MGI elected, MGI residual and RFFI residual
shareholdings are used.
5.4  Estimation results
Regression results for the first specification, where ownership data are represented by a
dummy variable for state participation (in any form, including golden shares) in a company
and labour productivity and profitability are used as dependent variables are reported in
Table 4 in the Appendix. They show that the performance of companies in 2000 is positi-
vely and statistically significantly correlated with their performance in 1993. In fact, lag-
ged performance is the single most important explanatory variable in both regressions
(with t-statistics exceeding 31 and 11 respectively). There is a negative and statistically
significant impact of federal state ownership on company performance. In companies whe-
re the state has a stake, labour productivity is only 75% compared to other firms in the sa-
me industries. Profitability is in turn 5% lower (in absolute terms) relative to enterprises
without state participation. It is worth noting that the coefficients on the state ownership
dummy become a little bit larger (in absolute value) – indicating worse performance by
firms with government ownership – when lagged performance variables are removed from
the regressions
27. Control variables such as size, a monopoly dummy and industry are sta-
tistically significant. In particular, performance turns out to be better in smaller and mono-
polistic firms. The latter result is consistent with the microeconomic theory predicting that
monopolies can earn supernormal profits unless they are subject to regulation.
The second specification with a continuous variable for federal state ownership and a
dummy for golden shares shows a negative and statistically significant impact of state sha-
reholdings on firm performance (see Table 5 in the Appendix). An increase of the state
share in company equity by 10% causes an almost 6.5% drop in labour productivity. The
same increase in the state share makes profitability drop by 1.2% (in absolute terms). The
                                                
26 Regressions were also done with the whole sample without winsorising. The results were almost
identical.
27 This result is confirmed in other specifications. It implies that the firms in which the state has an
interest were indeed performing slightly worse than others even in 1993, but this difference in
initial conditions in 1993 cannot fully explain the poor performance of companies with state
participation in 2000. Therefore, worse performance in 2000 is likely to stem from state ownership.Alexander Muravyev Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies: 0rigin,
forms and consequences for enterprise performance
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coefficient on the golden share variable is negative, but statistically insignificant in both
cases.
The third specification introduces a distinction between two types of state sharehol-
dings – those kept by MGI and those held by RFFI. It turns out that the impact of these two
types of shareholdings on company performance is different (see Table 6 in the Appendix).
A general result is that blocks held by RFFI worsen company performance significantly
while MGI shareholdings have a much weaker negative impact, if they affect performance
at all. The presence of the golden share has no effect on company performance.
The fourth specification introduces a distinction between elected and residual sharehol-
dings kept by MGI (see Table 7 in the Appendix). It turns out that elected shareholdings
have no negative impact on either labour productivity or profitability. Residual sharehol-
dings held by MGI have a negative impact on labour productivity and no statistically signi-
ficant impact on profitability. RFFI shareholdings have a negative and statistically signifi-
cant impact on both labour productivity and profitability. Importantly, in the regression
with labour productivity, the coefficients on MGI and RFFI residual shareholdings are sta-
tistically different. Similar to previous regressions, the golden share does not have any ef-
fect on either labour productivity or profitability.
6  Summary of findings and implications
These results can be summarized in the following way. In general, the performance of
companies in which the state has any ownership stake is significantly worse relative to
companies without state participation. This negative effect of state ownership does not
appear to be a consequence of the concentration of initially bad firms in the hands of the
state during the privatisation process (selection of better firms for privatisation). Therefore,
state ownership is detrimental to company performance.
There are remarkable differences in the performance of companies with different ty-
pes of state shareholdings, which have to be explained. Regression analysis indicates that
companies with federal state shareholdings kept by MGI perform better than companies
with state blocks in the hands of RFFI. A more detailed analysis shows that the performan-
ce of companies with RFFI residual blocks is the worst compared to the performance of
companies with MGI elected and MGI residual shareholdings. It is worth noting that com-
panies with RFFI shares fail on standard measures of performance such as labour producti-
vity and profitability despite the fact that they are more likely to be "normal" commercial-
ly-oriented firms which, in contrast to "strategically important enterprises" with elected
shareholdings, are not supposed to attain any goals besides profit maximisation.
To explain the failure of RFFI one must take a closer look at what is special about its
shareholdings. One of the commonly cited reasons for the failure of RFFI companies, na-
mely that the Fund was left with a large number of blocks which had not been sold due to
the lack of buyers (blocks in bad companies), is not supported by this study. It also shows
that the somewhat better financial incentives that RFFI has relative to MGI are of no help
in improving enterprise performance. Hence, the lack of control over enterprises with fede-
ral state ownership seems to be the major explanation. This argument is particularly valid
for RFFI shareholdings, since their voting power was restricted for many years and most of
them were de facto at the disposal of regional authorities.
The view that control matters is also supported by the comparison of MGI elected and
residual blocks. Econometric analysis indicates that the former are better in terms of theirBank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2002
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impact on labour productivity. As was shown in the descriptive part of the paper, the major
difference between the two categories is the degree of control over respective firms. Ot-
herwise these two groups of shareholdings are relatively similar. In particular, their size is
not much different and they have the same origin.
A more general conclusion from this analysis is that in Russia the distortion of the
objective functions of firms due to state interference is not as dangerous as the lack of
control over the companies and deficient monitoring of managers in particular. This high-
lights the importance of improvements in the field of corporate governance in Russia,
which has been documented in much previous research.
Another important result emerging from this study is that the golden share generally has no
detrimental impact on company performance. It is therefore a less dangerous instrument to
protect the interests of the state through retaining some degree of control over companies
compared to keeping blocks of their shares.
Several policy implications may be drawn from this analysis. First, the government
should avoid keeping equity stakes in companies unless there is a good reason to retain
them. Privatisation of most blocks remaining in state ownership is therefore recommended.
Second, if the government wants to keep an ownership stake in a company, greater control
on the part of the state is better for the improved performance of firms. This means that
control structures must be improved. In turn, the need for reliable control over companies
implies that state shareholdings in the same company should not be split between different
ministries or agencies, which is often the case in Russia. Finally, the issuing of golden sha-
res in important companies is a reasonable alternative to retaining some control over them
through equity ownership.Alexander Muravyev Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies: 0rigin,




The database is represented by several files and contains the company name, address, go-
vernment ownership stake (and types of government shareholdings) as well as information
about representatives of the state in corporate boards. In addition, there is information
about the transfer of state shareholdings from the Ministry to the Property Fund or other
entities. Importantly, the database contains no financial or employment information about
the firms. Neither does the database contain enterprise identification codes such as okpos
(enterprise codes in the state registry) and okonkhs (codes of branch affiliation). The total
number of enterprises in the database is 3,798.
The database was processed in the following way. Firstly, the blocks of shares were
classified into three categories – elected blocks held by MGI, residual blocks held by MGI
and residual blocks held by the Property Fund. In the original database they were called
"elected", "residual and held by the Ministry" and "subject to sale" respectively. The
blocks from the latest category are classified as being held by RFFI, as in almost all cases
they are also marked as having been transferred to RFFI. The consistency of this classifi-
cation was checked for about 5% of the companies with the help of the Federal Commissi-
on on the Capital Market database (containing company ownership information) and pro-
ved to be correct.
Secondly, enterprise codes in the state registry (okpo) and their codes of branch affi-
liation (okonkh) were obtained from the Gnosis and Alba datasets as well as from the Re-
tan database
28. The codes were necessary in order to obtain key financials of the enterpri-
ses, primarily from the Alba dataset. Identification of the codes required a case-by-case
search on the basis of enterprise name and address.
Companies were grouped according to their branch affiliation (distinguished on the
basis of the first figure in their five-digit okonkh codes) – industry, agriculture, transport
and communications, construction, trade, other (mostly industrial) services and an aggre-
gate category which includes such sectors as research institutes, health care, education,
housing and communal services.
                                                
28 Database of registrars, issuers, transfer-agents and nominal owners – www.retan.ru.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2002
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Table 4. The impact of federal state participation on company performance: regressions with state
               participation dummy
log(labour productivity) profitability
Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t
Lagged dependent variable .5015415 31.23 0.000 .1574786 11.43 0.000
state ownership dummy -.2687565 -9.14 0.000 -.0504704 -6.29 0.000
monopolist .0837894 2.58 0.010 .0209176 2.84 0.004
size -.0664346 -6.39 0.000 -.005501 -2.16 0.031
power utilities .3114507 5.12 0.000 -.0165007 -1.15 0.251
fuel .2687484 4.95 0.000 .0077852 0.45 0.652
ferrous metallurgy .1244996 2.25 0.024 -.0033266 -0.26 0.792
non-ferrous metallurgy .4016381 4.04 0.000 -.0357912 -1.22 0.224
chemical .2179393 3.64 0.000 -.0076841 -0.55 0.583
petrochemical .1113024 1.64 0.100 -.012686 -0.72 0.469
forestry, pulp and paper -.038371 -1.00 0.319 -.0363818 -3.81 0.000
stone and clay -.0900499 -2.68 0.007 -.0225055 -2.70 0.007
glass -.0505081 -0.82 0.410 .0595551 2.69 0.007
light -.3218753 -7.49 0.000 -.0193976 -1.91 0.056
food processing .1541397 4.55 0.000 -.0128663 -2.02 0.043
microbiology -.0447108 -0.29 0.773 -.0406955 -1.21 0.227
flour-grinding .0321316 0.44 0.662 .0090409 0.78 0.436
medical .4682731 6.31 0.000 .1076085 6.59 0.000
printing .3582315 4.73 0.000 .0672907 4.39 0.000
non-classified -.2771853 -2.58 0.010 .1174121 3.70 0.000
holding companies .0595962 0.11 0.911 -.2705122 -2.64 0.008
cons 1.409224 9.54 0.000 .0773683 4.12 0.000
Number of obs 4467 4094
F( 21,  4445) 168.36 15.84
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.4527 0.0840Alexander Muravyev Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies: 0rigin,
forms and consequences for enterprise performance
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Table 5. The impact of federal state participation on company performance: regressions with
              continuous state ownership variable and golden share dummy
log(labour productivity) profitability
Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t
lagged dependent variable .5065315 31.39 0.000 .1597224 11.52 0.000
state ownership stake -.0062411 -7.25 0.000 -.0012004 -4.81 0.000
golden share dummy -.0977913 -1.22 0.222 -.0191886 -0.84 0.401
monopolist .086447 2.66 0.008 .0212379 2.87 0.004
size -.0708181 -6.80 0.000 -.0063121 -2.48 0.013
power utilities .3193383 5.23 0.000 -.0137582 -0.96 0.338
fuel .2771189 5.05 0.000 .0106489 0.61 0.539
ferrous metallurgy .1096777 2.01 0.045 -.0057896 -0.46 0.646
non-ferrous metallurgy .374039 3.73 0.000 -.0396016 -1.35 0.179
chemical .2087248 3.47 0.001 -.0087641 -0.62 0.535
petrochemical .112222 1.63 0.102 -.0120809 -0.70 0.487
forestry, pulp and paper -.0372429 -0.97 0.334 -.0364277 -3.84 0.000
stone and clay -.089389 -2.65 0.008 -.0215814 -2.57 0.010
glass -.0461047 -0.73 0.468 .0606148 2.73 0.006
light -.3168931 -7.28 0.000 -.0182716 -1.76 0.078
food processing .1583098 4.66 0.000 -.0109051 -1.71 0.087
microbiology -.0243364 -0.15 0.879 -.0358346 -1.07 0.286
flour-grinding .0145771 0.20 0.843 .0081238 0.70 0.482
medical .4255332 5.90 0.000 .0996842 6.35 0.000
printing .3747119 4.98 0.000 .0705619 4.57 0.000
non-classified -.2630902 -2.46 0.014 .1210104 3.78 0.000
holding companies .0321657 0.06 0.950 -.2769503 -2.52 0.012
cons 1.380022 9.26 0.000 .0788789 4.21 0.000
Number of obs 4467 4094
F( 22,  4444) 158.47 14.62
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.4488 0.0796Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2002
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Table 6. The impact of federal state participation on company performance: regressions with
              continuous variables for MGI and RFFI shareholdings and golden share dummy
log(labour productivity) profitability
Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t
lagged dependent variable .5038484 31.24 0.000 .1554252 11.10 0.000
MGI stake -.0022408 -1.85 0.064 -.0003756 -1.27 0.203
RFFI stake -.0100341 -8.05 0.000 -.0020233 -4.93 0.000
golden share dummy -.0659767 -0.82 0.410 -.0137052 -0.60 0.550
monopolist .0841144 2.58 0.010 .0204848 2.76 0.006
size -.0730476 -7.00 0.000 -.0066488 -2.62 0.009
power utilities .3264502 5.37 0.000 -.013256 -0.93 0.352
fuel .2663398 4.82 0.000 .0072919 0.42 0.676
ferrous metallurgy .1167416 2.13 0.034 -.0046504 -0.37 0.714
non-ferrous metallurgy .3825973 3.77 0.000 -.0382519 -1.28 0.200
chemical .2206562 3.68 0.000 -.0066083 -0.47 0.639
petrochemical .1198052 1.75 0.081 -.0107533 -0.62 0.536
forestry, pulp and paper -.0227164 -0.59 0.556 -.0336328 -3.58 0.000
stone and clay -.0883846 -2.62 0.009 -.0217176 -2.59 0.010
glass -.0321625 -0.51 0.610 .0614669 2.77 0.006
light -.3093695 -7.12 0.000 -.0166944 -1.62 0.106
food processing .1538379 4.55 0.000 -.0124893 -1.96 0.050
microbiology -.0628622 -0.38 0.701 -.0495588 -1.44 0.150
flour-grinding -.0036504 -0.05 0.961 .0031754 0.28 0.782
medical .4189853 5.87 0.000 .0983562 6.28 0.000
printing .3849256 5.02 0.000 .0734396 4.63 0.000
non-classified -.2735182 -2.51 0.012 .1195301 3.80 0.000
holding companies .0415551 0.09 0.932 -.2755417 -2.48 0.013
cons 1.416531 9.50 0.000 .0823188 4.40 0.000
Number of obs 4467 4094
F( 23,  4443) 153.11 14.37
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.4518 0.0842Alexander Muravyev Federal state shareholdings in Russian companies: 0rigin,
forms and consequences for enterprise performance
32
Table 7. The impact of federal state participation on company performance: regressions with
              continuous variables for MGI elected, MGI and RFFI residual shareholdings and golden
              share dummy
log(labour productivity) profitability
Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t
lagged dependent variable .5027467 31.22 0.000 .1554884 11.08 0.000
MGI stake (elected) .0011721 0.71 0.481 -.0004007 -0.99 0.325
MGI stake (residual) -.0048592 -2.88 0.004 -.0003576 -0.88 0.381
RFFI stake -.0101006 -8.10 0.000 -.0020231 -4.93 0.000
golden share dummy -.0606263 -0.76 0.450 -.0137465 -0.60 0.548
monopolist .08211 2.52 0.012 .0204951 2.76 0.006
size -.0732039 -7.02 0.000 -.0066462 -2.62 0.009
power utilities .326366 5.37 0.000 -.0132438 -0.93 0.353
fuel .2698648 4.91 0.000 .0072845 0.42 0.677
ferrous metallurgy .1157732 2.11 0.035 -.0046397 -0.37 0.714
non-ferrous metallurgy .3847285 3.82 0.000 -.0382623 -1.28 0.200
chemical .2205109 3.68 0.000 -.0066042 -0.47 0.639
petrochemical .121054 1.76 0.078 -.0107619 -0.62 0.536
forestry, pulp and paper -.0241486 -0.63 0.531 -.0336238 -3.57 0.000
stone and clay -.0878529 -2.61 0.009 -.0217192 -2.59 0.010
glass -.0336613 -0.53 0.594 .0614756 2.77 0.006
light -.3104738 -7.14 0.000 -.0166853 -1.62 0.106
food processing .1509518 4.46 0.000 -.0124578 -1.94 0.052
microbiology -.027837 -0.17 0.864 -.0498608 -1.45 0.146
flour-grinding -.0013369 -0.02 0.985 .0031696 0.28 0.782
medical .4188158 5.91 0.000 .0983644 6.28 0.000
printing .3849626 5.03 0.000 .0734305 4.63 0.000
non-classified -.2675332 -2.50 0.013 .1194958 3.80 0.000
holding companies .028705 0.06 0.952 -.275404 -2.48 0.013
cons 1.42828 9.59 0.000 .0822748 4.39 0.000
Number of obs 4467 4094
F( 24,  4442) 147.31 13.79
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.4528 0.0842Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 12/2002
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